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Introduction
This article asserts that the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appel-
late Body's (AB) concepts and terminology concerning a claimant's burden
of proof-prima facie case, presumption, and burden shifting-are disturb-
ingly ambiguous and potentially misleading. An important task for future
AB decisions should be to clarify the existing ambiguity and to develop a
more conceptually sound use of burden of proof terminology. That said,
even in the face of the existing ambiguity, one can make general sense of
the WTO burden of proof concept through attention to the distinctive fea-
tures of the WTO procedural system and by generously reading AB opin-
t William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law and Reich Director, Berger
International Legal Studies Program, Cornell University Law School. © 2008 John J.
Barcel6 III. All Rights Reserved.
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ions. In the final analysis, the concept of overriding importance is the
burden of persuasion. Although the AB formulates some decisions in ways
that may raise doubts about the following conclusion, the WTO system
fundamentally puts the burden of persuasion on the complaining member
as to its basic claim of a WTO violation (and on the responding member as
to any affirmative defenses) and does not shift this burden during the
course of the proceeding.
In recently published scholarly works, two members of the AB,
Yasuhei Taniguchi and David Unterhalter, reached this same conclusion:
the burden of persuasion rests on the complaining member as to that mem-
ber's basic claim and does not shift during the proceedings.' Both
Taniguchi and Unterhalter seem to suggest, however, that the burden of
production-not persuasion-might be described as shifting either because
the claimant made out a prima facie case or because of a presumption. 2
This article argues that a shifting production burden could have meaning
only in a colloquial sense (in any contest at any point in time one side or
the other is "winning," and the other side must do something to catch up),
but not in a formal or functional sense that would have a practical effect on
the proceeding. However, because the AB's burden-shifting language could
easily-perhaps most naturally-be read as having a formal, functional
meaning, the language can be misleading to parties and panels in future
proceedings.
Thus, this article argues that the AB should abandon these concepts-
prima facie case, presumption, and a shifting burden-in connection with
a complaining member's basic claim (or a responding member's defense).
The AB should simply state that a complaining member bears the burden
of proof on its basic claim and that the responding member, in good faith,
should submit rebutting evidence to assist the panel and support its ver-
sion of the disputed facts. The reverse would hold for the responding mem-
ber's defenses.
To develop this argument, Part I explains the source of the current
WTO burden of proof terminology. Part II discusses how these concepts
(burden of proof, prima facie case, and presumption) would be understood
in common law and civil law systems. Against this backdrop, Part III dis-
cusses the WTO panel procedure itself and why the AB burden of proof
1. See Yasuhei Taniguchi, Understanding the Concept of Prima Facie Proof in WTO
Dispute Settlement, in THE WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT & DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES 553, 558 (Merit E. Janow, Victoria Donaldson & Alan Yanovich eds., 2008); David
Unterhalter, The Burden of Proof in WTO Dispute Settlement, in THE WTO: GOVERNANCE,
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT & DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra, at 543, 544. In an earlier piece,
Joost Pauwelyn also concluded that the burden of proof, understood as the burden of
persuasion, does not shift from one party to the other during the course of a WTO
proceeding. Joost Pauwelyn, Evidence, Proof and Persuasion in WTO Dispute Settlement, 1
J. INT'L ECON. L. 227, 252-58 (1998). Note that one should not conclude that no legal
system ever allows the burden of persuasion to shift. In both U.S. and German proce-
dure the persuasion burden does in fact shift in a number of contexts, as will be dis-
cussed later in the text. See discussion infra Part III.
2. See Taniguchi, supra note 1, at 566-67, 569-71; Unterhalter, supra note 1, at
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terminology is confusing and potentially misleading. The concluding sec-
tion restates the basic argument in favor of abandoning, or at least clarify-
ing, the AB's problematic terminology.
I. Basic WTO Concepts: Burden of Proof, Prima Facie Cases, and
Presumption
Especially from a common law perspective, 3 but even considering how
a civilian might understand concepts such as prima facie and presump-
tion, the WTO's current articulation of its burden of proof rules generates
considerable confusion. The often-cited starting point is the AB decision
in US- Shirts and Blouses.4 There the AB said the following:
[Ilt is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and,
in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party,
whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particu-
lar claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a pre-
sumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party,
who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.5
In other decisions, especially in EC-Hormones,6 the AB added the
3. Common law jurisdictions are not monolithic. The discussion in the text there-
fore refers only to U.S. common law practice, even though in the rest of the text the
simple term "common law procedure" or "common law practice" is used without clarify-
ing that only U.S. common law is intended.
4. Appellate Body Report, United States- Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool
Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997) (adopted May 23, 1997)
[hereinafter US-Shirts and Blouses]. Commentators often cite US-Shirts and Blouses
uncritically, implying that it articulates an unproblematic explanation of burden of
proof in WTO proceedings. For example, concerning burden of proof and US- Shirts
and Blouses, Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas J. Schoenbaum and Petros S. Mavroidis have
commented that the decision establishes the general principle
that it is incumbent on the party challenging the conduct of another party to
adduce prima facie evidence of facts and law to show that the conduct of the
challenged party is in violation of the provision in question. When such a proof
is established, the burden of proof is shifted to the party under challenge to
adduce a rebuttal that the allegation of the challenging party is not based on an
appropriate ground.
MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 126 (2d ed. 2006). Raj Bhala also restates the
meaning of burden of proof found in US- Shirts and Blouses. Bhala states:
Thus the burden of proof rule has three steps to be followed in seriatim. First, a
complainant Member must present a prima facie case. Second, if it does, then it
creates a rebuttable presumption that the measure complained of is inconsistent
with the applicable rule. Third, the burden shifts to the respondent Member to
rebut the presumption.
RAj BIALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE 165 (3d
ed. 2008). While these quoted summaries accurately reflect the language the AB used in
US- Shirts and Blouses, one is driven to ask why, especially as a general rule of burden of
proof, the burden should shift once the complaining party makes out a mere prima facie
case.
5. US-Shirts and Blouses, supra note 4, at 14 (emphasis added).
6. Appellate Body Report, European Communities- Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinaf-
ter EC- Hormones].
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concept of a prima facie case:
The initial burden lies on the complaining party, which must establish a
prima facie case of inconsistency with a particular provision ... on the part
of the defending party .... When that prima facie case is made, the burden
of proof moves to the defending party, which must in turn counter or refute
the claimed inconsistency. This seems straightforward enough and is in
conformity with our ruling in United States- Shirts and Blouses .... 7
Thus, the AB equates a claimant presenting a prima facie case with raising
a rebuttable presumption in the claimant's favor.
These two leading decisions seem to say two things. First, they say
that a claimant has an obligation to get beyond a certain threshold-articu-
lated as a prima facie case. If the claimant presents enough evidence to get
beyond that threshold, then this state of the evidence raises a presumption
in the claimant's favor. Second, the decisions state that this prima facie
case (or presumption) shifts the "burden" to the respondent. It is not at all
clear, however, precisely what burden shifts.8 Note that in US- Shirts and
Blouses, the AB states that "the burden shifts,"9 whereas in EC- Hormones,
the AB actually states that "the burden of proof moves." 10 It is also unclear
why any burden should be shifted at the stage in which a claimant has
presented a mere prima facie case.11
Certainly the AB's formulations are ambiguous. At least three of the
AB's operative concepts need clarification: burden of proof, prima facie
case, and presumption. In common law practice these concepts have well-
developed meanings, although the meanings may vary with the context.
Still, none of the normally employed common law understandings would
accord with the WTO usage in the quoted decisions above. 12 The same
could be said of the way civilians would understand this terminology. To
explain further the dilemmas caused by the WTO's burden of proof formu-
lations, the next section gives a brief synopsis of common law and civil law
approaches to burden of proof. This is well-traveled terrain, 13 but it is use-
ful to help explain why the AB's terminology causes serious trouble. For
7. Id. 98.
8. See US-Shirts and Blouses, supra note 4, at 16 (discussing the shifting of the
burden, but failing to identify which burden has shifted).
9. Id.
10. EC-Hormones, supra note 6, 1 98 (emphasis added).
11. See US- Shirts and Blouses, supra note 4, at 7 (discussing the shifting of the bur-
den after India presented a prima facie case, but failing to give any reasons why said
burden shifts).
12. Compare RIcHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCE-
DURE: MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE 34-35, 1319-24 (9th ed. 2007) [hereinafter CIVIL
PROCEDURE] (giving common law definitions for "burden of proof' and "presumptions"),
with US-Shirts and Blouses, supra note 4, at 13-16 (discussing the AB's interpretation of
"burden of proof'), and EC-Hormones, supra note 6, IN 110-119 (discussing the AB's
interpretation of "presumptions").
13. Joost Pauwelyn, Yasuhei Taniguchi, and David Unterhalter all give excellent and
insightful discussions of many of the points discussed in this article, though their
emphases, interpretations, and analyses vary from one another and from those of this
essay. See generally Pauwelyn, supra note 1; Taniguchi, supra note 1; Unterhalter, supra
note 1.
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the common law, we will use U.S. practice as an example14 and for civil
law, the German procedural system. 15
1I. Burden of Proof in Common Law and Civil Law
A. U.S. Common Law Practice' 6
1. Burden of Production and Burden of Persuasion
Burden of proof in common law practice comprises two separate con-
cepts: i) burden of production and ii) burden of persuasion. 17 At the out-
set, both burdens rest on the party urging a particular claim. 18 The burden
of production means that the party bearing the burden-the claimant at the
outset-must present evidence to support its version of all disputed facts
and all mixed questions of law and fact, such as the existence of negligence
or discrimination. 19 The burden of persuasion means that the party bear-
ing the burden-again, the claimant at the outset-must bear the risk that
after evaluating all the evidence and arguments presented by both sides the
adjudicator will be in equipoise.20 In this situation, the benefit of the
doubt goes to the opponent of the party bearing the persuasion burden-
i.e., to the respondent on the claimant's basic claim.21 Thus, the claimant
bears the risk of failing to move the adjudicator past the point of equipoise.
The role of the production burden in common law is closely tied to the
use of juries in civil cases. 2 2 It allows the judge to keep jury decisions
within the basic bounds of rationality. 23 A judge will not send a case to the
jury if the claimant does not meet its production burden. 24 The standard
the judge uses is whether the claimant has presented sufficient evidence so
that a reasonable juror (drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
claimant) could decide for the claimant on all essential issues. 25 Authori-
ties sometimes describe this state of evidence as one in which reasonable
persons could disagree about how to decide. 26
For efficiency and practicality reasons tied to the use of lay jurors, a
common law trial continues from start to finish, on consecutive days, with-
out interruption (to minimize disruption to the lives of the jurors), until the
court gives the case to the jury for a decision, and the jury renders a ver-
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See generally CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 12, at 1308-18.
17. See id. at 1309 (citing JOHN M. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND THE COM-
MON LAW 175-77 (1947)).
18. See id. at 1309-10, 1313.
19. See id. at 1309-10.
20. See id. at 1311.
21. See id. at 1311-12.
22. Cf. id. at 1309-10 (describing how a judge uses the production burden to pre-
vent a case from getting to the jury in certain circumstance).
23. See id. at 1310.
24. See id. at 1309.
25. See id. at 1310.
26. See id.
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dict. 27 For closely related reasons, evidence is presented sequentially. 28
First the claimant presents its evidence, and then the respondent presents
its case. 29 A sequential pattern allows the judge to decide, after the claim-
ant presents his or her case, whether there is any need to continue the
proceeding to hear the respondent's counterevidence. 30 The burden of pro-
duction comes in here. At the end of the claimant's case, the respondent
will typically move for a directed verdict (also called "judgment as a matter
of law"). 31 The judge will grant that motion-and consequently dismiss
the case-only if the claimant has failed to meet the burden of produc-
tion.32 Thus, the judge will grant the respondent's motion only if the
claimant has failed to produce enough evidence so that at least one reason-
able person could decide for the claimant. 33 If the judge denies the
directed verdict motion, normally the respondent will then present its
case.
34
Note that if the judge refuses a directed verdict motion and the respon-
dent fails to present any evidence in rebuttal, the claimant will not necessa-
rily win.35 The judge has only decided that, on the state of the presented
evidence, reasonable persons could disagree. 36 If the respondent presents
no evidence at all and merely argues that the jury should not draw the
inferences from the claimant's evidence that the claimant urges, then the
jurors must decide how they will actually decide the case. 37 If the jury
decides for the claimant, then the claimant has met both its burden of pro-
duction and its burden of persuasion. If the jury instead decides for the
respondent, then the claimant has met its burden of production, but not its
burden of persuasion. Of course, as to the burden of persuasion, the judge
tells the jury that the jury must decide for the respondent if they find them-
selves in equipoise on an essential element of the claimant's case.38 Thus,
the jury could decide for the respondent, either because they find the
claimant's case simply unpersuasive, or because they find themselves in
equipoise.
If a claimant presents a case that goes well beyond the basic threshold
posed by the need to meet the production burden so as to be overwhelm-
27. Hein K6tz cites this feature as perhaps the most salient distinction between com-
mon law and civil law procedure in a civil trial. See Hein K6tz, Civil Justice Systems in
Europe and the United States, 13 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 61, 71-72 (2003).
28. See CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 12, at 154-55.
29. See id. at 153-54.
30. See id. at 154.
31. See id.
32. See id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
33. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1) (noting that the court may grant judgment as a mat-
ter of law if "the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient
evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue").
34. See CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 12, at 154-55.
35. See id. at 154.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 154, 179.
38. V. C. Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Poof, 14
VAND. L. REv. 807, 817 (1961).
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ing, then such a presentation by the claimant would be described as having
shifted the production burden to the respondent.39 In other words, in such
a situation, if the respondent fails to present any rebuttal evidence, the
respondent would lose as a matter of law.40 Saying that a claimant's evi-
dence is so strong as to shift the production burden to the respondent is
also saying that on the basis of the claimant's unrebutted evidence alone,
no reasonable person could fail to find for the claimant. 4 1 This is the stan-
dard a judge would use in ruling on a claimant's motion for a directed
verdict if the respondent presents no rebuttal evidence after the claimant
has presented its case. 42 If a judge grants the motion, it means that the
judge has found the claimant's case to be overwhelming and effectively to
have shifted the production burden to the respondent.43
Note that if the respondent does present rebuttal evidence sufficient to
move the case back into a state in which there is enough conflict in the
evidence for reasonable persons to disagree about the outcome, then the
burden of persuasion still rests on the claimant.4 4 A very strong claimant's
case may shift the production burden, but it does not shift the persuasion
burden.4 5 Note also that if the respondent's rebuttal evidence is over-
whelmingly strong, this could have the effect of shifting the production
burden back to the claimant, forcing the claimant to come forward with
further rebuttal evidence of its own-and so on.46 Again, whether the pro-
duction burden had been shifted back to the claimant would be tested by a
respondent's motion for directed verdict.4 7 The case goes to the jury only
when the state of the evidence (coming from one or both sides) is such that
reasonable persons could disagree about the outcome. 48 Thus, on the
claimant's basic case, the production burden may shift back and forth
between the claimant and respondent, but the persuasion burden stays
with the claimant and does not shift. Other devices, such as a legal pre-
sumption, however, could have the effect of shifting the production bur-
den-and in special cases even the persuasion burden-to the respondent,
as discussed later.49
This same basic pattern prevails even if there is no jury and the judge
decides the facts and the law (called a bench trial).50 The judge is merely
substituted for the jury as the fact finder. The trial still occurs in one con-
tinuous hearing, evidence is presented sequentially, and the claimant must
meet a production burden before the respondent is called upon to rebut.
39. See CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 12, at 1310.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 155, 1310.
47. See id. at 1310.
48. See id. at 1310-11.
49. See infra Part II.A.3.
50. See CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 12, at 153.
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2. Standard of Proof5 l
For a full understanding of the common law burden of proof, one
must also know what standard of proof the adjudicator is required to apply.
In common law usage, "standard of proof' refers to the threshold of
probability that must be exceeded in the adjudicator's evaluation of the
evidence in order for the adjudicator to reach judgments about the exis-
tence of historical facts and to apply legal concepts to historical facts to
reach legal conclusions. 52 In criminal cases, the standard of proof is
"beyond a reasonable doubt," and in civil cases it is generally "preponder-
ance of the evidence"-which typically means "more probable than not" or
more than 50% probable.5 3 Thus, a full statement of the question put to
the judge on a respondent's directed verdict motion at the end of the claim-
ant's case is whether, after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
claimant and applying the standard of more probable than not, reasonable
persons could disagree about whether to find for the claimant.5 4
Note that although the normal standard of proof in a civil case is pre-
ponderance of the evidence, in special circumstances a higher standard of
proof may be required.5 5 This higher standard, sometimes called "clear
and convincing" evidence, is probably best understood as requiring a level
of probability in between "preponderance" on the lower end and "beyond a
reasonable doubt" on the higher end.5 6 The higher standard may be used
in cases in which the social costs of what is conventionally called "Type I"
error, finding a violation or liability where none exists, are judged to be
unusually high.5 7
In its decisions to date, the WTO seems to have given little or no atten-
tion to the standard of proof issue. 58 The decisions tend to speak of
whether or not the panel (or AB) is convinced by the evidence and argu-
ments, without specifying in more detail precisely what standard of proof
the panel (or AB) is applying.5 9 In a 2008 piece, David Unterhalter, a cur-
rent AB member, has speculated that a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard applies as a general rule in WTO cases. 60 No AB decision to date,
51. See generally id. at 1324-31; Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure's Magical Number
Three: Psychological Bases for Standards of Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1115 (1987). For
a comparison of common law and civil law approaches to standards of proof, see Kevin
M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 50 Am. J.
COMP. L. 243 (2002).
52. See, e.g., Clermont & Sherwin, supra note 51, at 251.
53. See Clermont, supra note 51, at 1119-20.
54. Cf. CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 12, at 1352 (discussing different articulations of
the standard for a directed verdict).
55. See Clermont, supra note 51, at 1119.
56. See id.
57. See CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 12, at 1328-29.
58. See Unterhalter, supra note 1, at 551 (stating that "the Appellate Body has been
somewhat agnostic as to the quantum of evidence that suffices to establish a prima facie
case," and that it is unclear what this standard entails).
59. See id. (describing a variable standard for determining when evidence estab-
lishes a prima facie case).
60. Cf. id. at 552. Unterhalter's status as an AB member, along with his conclusion
that "standard of proof is necessarily a concept cast in probabilistic terms" and that
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however, has discussed standard of proof in a straightforward and clear
way. 61 It would be helpful to have guidance from the AB on this point in a
future case, especially if a standard of proof greater than preponderance is
needed to protect important societal values from easy litigious attack: in
other words, to protect target governments from Type I error.62
3. Prima Facie Case and Presumption6 3
We now turn to the meaning of prima facie case and presumption in
common law practice. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in a footnote in
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,6 4 the phrase "prima
facie case" may be used in two senses. 65 In one sense, as the words them-
selves imply, prima facie case means evidence merely sufficient to meet the
claimant's production burden-that is, evidence that will withstand a
directed verdict motion and get the case to the jury (i.e., on the basis of
which reasonable persons can disagree). 66 We can refer to this usage as
"prima facie in the weak sense." Prima facie in the weak sense would not
mean a case that was so strong as to shift the production burden to the
respondent (evidence upon which no reasonable person could fail to find
for the claimant). The latter case would be an overwhelming case, not
merely a sufficient prima facie case.
The second usage, as described in the Burdine footnote,6 7 can be
"there seems little reason not to adopt a standard that is clear and well understood in
other contexts, the most obvious candidate being proof on a balance of probabilities"
suggests that preponderance of the evidence is the general rule in WTO cases. See id.
61. See id. at 551.
62. One might understand the AB's reasoning in EC-Asbestos as effectively requir-
ing a higher standard of proof to give greater regulatory discretion to governments seek-
ing to control health risks stemming from potentially dangerous products. See generally
Appellate Body Report, European Communities- Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001). Although the AB does not
speak explicitly in standard of proof terms, its discussion comes very close. For exam-
ple, on the issue of "likeness" of products (asbestos compared to PCG fibres), the AB
explained that Canada would bear a heavy burden to show that the products were "like"
once it was clear that the products were physically different in a way that caused asbes-
tos to pose a serious health risk (cancer) not present with the other products. See id. I
118. Indeed the majority ruled for the EC on the ground that Canada had failed to meet
that burden. Id. 1 126. Again in its analysis of the "necessity test" under Article XX(b)
(to protect human, animal, or plant life or health), the AB said that if serious health
consequences are potentially at stake (e.g., cancer), a regulating government would have
more leeway in meeting the necessity test. See id. 172. Putting this point differently,
one could say that the standard of proof-or of persuasiveness-needed to require a
regulating government to use an alternative means to the same health end would be
greater than normal.
63. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 365-69 (2000) (discussing burden of proof
and presumptions in the common law); CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 12, at 1319-24.
64. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
65. Id. at 254 n.7.
66. That this is the way prima facie is understood (at least as to its use in common
law) in Pauwelyn, supra note 1, at 229.
67. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7.
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called "prima facie in the strong sense."68 This usage links the prima facie
case with the concept of a "legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption."69
Here, the concept of a presumption has a fairly rigorous meaning and an
important procedural effect. It functions in the following way. If the claim-
ant establishes certain facts (A(1), A(2), A(3), etc.,), then a legal rule inter-
venes to cause Fact B to be treated as established unless the respondent
rebuts the existence of Fact B. That rebuttal burden could shift just the
production burden to the respondent or even shift the full burden of proof
on the existence of Fact B.
For example, in the well-known McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
case,70 the U.S. Supreme Court held that if, in a claim of racial discrimina-
tion, the plaintiff shows that i) he belongs to a racial minority; ii) he
applied for and was qualified for a job an employer sought to fill; iii) he was
rejected; and iv) after his rejection, the job remained open, and the
employer continued to consider applicants with his qualifications, then a
legal presumption of racial discrimination arises. 71 This legal presump-
tion operates to shift the production burden to the employer to come for-
ward with evidence explaining why the employer's actions were not racially
motivated. If the employer can meet this production burden with credible
evidence, the persuasion burden on the ultimate fact of racial discrimina-
tion remains on the plaintiff.
7 2
Note that this use of a "legal presumption" alters the normal burden of
proof rules. Normally, from evidence of facts (i) through (iv) above, one
might say that an inference of discrimination was permissible, but not
required. Usually, the production burden would shift only if the claimant's
evidentiary case is overwhelming-that is, only if no reasonable person
could fail to draw an inference of the ultimate fact (of racial discrimina-
tion).73 A court introduces the device of a "legal presumption" for social
policy reasons, including perhaps a judgment that what is customarily
called Type II error (failing to find discrimination where it exists) poses a
greater social problem than Type I error (finding discrimination where
none exists).
In certain circumstances, a court might allow a legal presumption to
shift even the persuasion burden-resulting in a shift of the full burden of
proof.74 But the main point is that a common law court employs such a
68. Cf. Unterhalter, supra note 1, at 549-50 (discussing the "strict account of a
prima facie case").
69. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7 (emphasis added).
70. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
71. Id. at 802-03.
72. The Court in Burdine declared that the presumption shifts only the production
burden and not the burden of persuasion. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
73. For further discussion on burden of proof and burden of persuasion see CIVIL
PROCEDURE, supra note 12, at 1319-39.
74. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 245-48 (1989) (holding
that in a gender discrimination case, if the plaintiff can show that impermissible fac-
tors-such as gender-influenced the decision to not promote the plaintiff for partner-
ship, then the entire burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that discrimination
did not influence the decision).
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"legal presumption" only in special circumstances, and it does so in part
for social policy reasons and perhaps also because the respondent has
greater access to relevant information (e.g., its motivation for the disputed
decision). The operative effect of a legal presumption is that once the
claimant shows Fact A to exist through direct proof, Fact B is always treated
as established-as a matter of law, not direct proof-unless the respondent
introduces evidence to rebut the existence of B.75
B. Burden of Proof in the German Civil Law System
We turn here to a brief sketch of the German civil law approach to
burden of proof, prima facie case, and presumption. As in most civil law
jurisdictions (but in contrast with common law jurisdictions), a civil pro-
ceeding in Germany usually stretches over several hearings and does not
involve a jury.7 6 A second point of contrast with common law is that prior
to and during any given hearing, both sides are likely to submit evidence
simultaneously 77 rather than present evidence sequentially. 78
Given these features of German trial practice, burden of persuasion is
the key component of burden of proof. The concept of a production bur-
den has a very limited meaning. It arises in a complainant's basic case
(and a respondent's defense), if the facts at issue are disputed. The propo-
nent of disputed facts-the claimant, respecting the claimant's basic
claim-must be prepared to indicate to the court what kind of evidence it
will submit to prove its version of the facts. 79 This is known as the Beweis-
fiihrungslast.8 0 If the claimant is not prepared to offer probative evidence
concerning an essential fact, the court will simply dismiss the claim.8 1
On the one hand, Beweisfuihrungslast resembles, but is really quite dif-
ferent from, the common law burden of production. The latter tests
whether the claimant's evidence actually adduced is sufficiently strong to
warrant a jury deliberation (because reasonable persons can disagree). At
common law, the respondent will present evidence only if the claimant
passes this test. In a German proceeding, as long as the claimant indicates
that it is prepared to offer probative evidence to convince the adjudicator of
the alleged facts, then, at subsequent hearings, both the claimant and the
respondent normally submit evidence simultaneously.82 The respondent's
evidence may seek to rebut the claimant's facts-as to which the claimant
bears the persuasion burden-or to establish facts that would constitute a
defense-as to which the respondent has the persuasion burden.8 3
75. This statement of course assumes that we are dealing with a rebuttable and not
an irrebutable presumption.
76. See K6tz, supra note 27, at 72.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 68-69, 72.
79. PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STORNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 267 (2004).
80. id.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 253-59.
83. See id. at 267 (noting that "the party who asserts a fact favoring that party's
claim or defense has the burden of proof of that fact").
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Throughout the proceeding, the burden of persuasion captures the real
meaning of burden of proof. Burden of production in the common law use
of the term does not exist.84
On the other hand, German practice does include concepts of pre-
sumption and prima facie proof.85 A presumption can arise because of a
statutory provision or because of a rule derived from case decisions.86 The
German concept of presumption generally operates in a manner similar to
the common law's strong sense of prima facie, as described earlier. 87 If the
claimant proves Fact A, the law will treat Fact B as established unless the
respondent rebuts the existence of Fact B. The presumption can have the
effect of shifting the entire burden of proof.88 For example, if the claimant
establishes that a physician committed gross malpractice, the persuasion
burden concerning whether the physician's improper actions caused claim-
ant's injuries shifts to the physician.89 The physician bears the full burden
of proving that the gross malpractice did not cause the claimant's injuries.
If the case involves what is called Anscheinsbeweis, or prima facie
proof, it again follows a pattern similar to the presumption case just
described.90 If the claimant proves Fact A, then the law treats Fact B as
established unless the respondent rebuts Fact B.91 For example, if the
claimant's evidence establishes that an instrument (respondent's car)
under the control of respondent hit and caused injury to the claimant while
the claimant was on the sidewalk, a German judge would treat the respon-
dent's negligence as established without requiring the claimant to show the
specific way in which the respondent was negligent-unless the respondent
could rebut the fact of negligence. 92 The rebuttal requirement might not
constitute a full shifting of the burden of persuasion, however, and in this
sense would be similar-but not identical-to the common law's shift of the
production burden.
For example, one commentator notes that if the respondent proves
that driver C, in a nearby car, forced the respondent's car off the road, then
the burden of persuasion concerning whether the respondent was never-
theless negligent remains on the claimant.93 One might understand this
example as a case in which the respondent has shown by rebuttal proof
that the conditions for the application of Anscheinsbeweis failed to exist. In
84. See Pauwelyn, supra note 1, at 230 n.7 (noting that in civil law there is nothing
similar to the common law motion practice to test whether an opponent's evidence
meets a production burden).
85. See MuRRAY & STORNER, supra note 79, at 269, 311.
86. See id. at 269.
87. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
88. See MuRRAY & STORNER, supra note 79, at 268.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 310-11.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 267. This example is similar to the way in which the common law doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur operates; except that at common law, res ipsa loquitur normally only
meets the claimant's burden of production without shifting the burden of production to
the respondent. See generally DOBBS, supra note 63, at 370-81.
93. WALTER ZEISS, ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 183 (1971).
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other words, the case did not meet the requirement that, in the ordinary
course of events, the accident would not have happened absent the respon-
dent's negligence. The respondent bears the full burden of proof as to
driver C's presence and actions. If the respondent succeeds, however, the
burden of proof as to whether the respondent was nevertheless negligent
still rests on the claimant.
III. Burden of Proof in WTO Jurisprudence
A. The Problematics of Prima Facie Case and Presumption
Against this background, it should be evident why the AB's burden of
proof formulations in United States-Shirts and Blouses9 4 and other deci-
sions pose interpretive dilemmas. 95 The AB says that the burden of proof
on any claim of a WTO violation rests initially on the claimant. 96 Then, if
the claimant adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that its
allegations are true, the "burden" shifts to the respondent to rebut the pre-
sumption.9 7 The respondent will fail if it does not meet this rebuttal bur-
den.98 In EC- Hormones, the AB treats a prima facie case established by a
claimant as the equivalent of a case that raises a presumption in the claim-
ant's favor. 99 If the claimant establishes a prima facie case, then the "bur-
den of proof moves" to the respondent. 10 0
Faced with these formulations, one may justifiably ask: what burden
shifts to the respondent? Is the burden that shifts only something like the
common law production burden, or does it include both the production
and persuasion burdens? Moreover, why should either burden shift? A
prima facie case in the common law "weak sense" would mean only that an
inference in favor of the claimant is permissible, not mandatory. It would
normally mean, as the words prima facie imply, that the complainant has
met a minimum required threshold of proof. A prima facie case, however,
would not shift the production burden, and it would certainly not shift the
burden of persuasion.
In EC- Hormones, the AB links a prima facie case with establishing a
presumption. 10 1 To a common law lawyer, this linkage might suggest that
the AB is equating presumption with the common law's strong prima facie
case described previously, 10 2 so that raising a presumption-by presenting
a strong prima facie case-would effectively shift either the production bur-
den or the full burden of proof. Something similar might be said from a
civil law perspective if one were to understand the AB's use of presumption
94. See generally US-Shirts and Blouses, supra note 4.
95. See generally Appellate Body Report, Korea- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/
DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R (Jan. 18, 1999).
96. US-Shirts and Blouses, supra note 4, at 14.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. See EC-Hormones, supra note 6, 98.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
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as having the German civil law meaning or as the equivalent of the German
Anscheinsbeweis. However, in the common law and civil law usages just
described, a presumption is an exceptional device, not one that operates as
part of the everyday burden of proof rules for ordinary cases. Moreover,
having common law or German civil law concepts in mind, one would be
inclined to ask for further clarification-in particular, what precise facts
(A(1), A(2), A(3), etc.,) must a WTO claimant show to trigger a presump-
tion that would treat Fact B (in context, presumably a WTO violation) as
provisionally established. The AB decisions do not speak in these terms.
Furthermore, one would want to know whether the presumption shifts
only the production burden or also the persuasion burden.
B. Prima Facie and Presumption in DSU Article 3.8
A comparison with the way the prima facie and presumption concepts
operate in DSU Article 3.8 is instructive. DSU Article 3.8 provides:
In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a
covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case
of nullification or impairment. This means that there is normally a pre-
sumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other Members
parties to that covered agreement, and in such cases, it shall be up to the
Member against whom the complaint has been brought to rebut the
charge. 103
Here, the prima facie and presumption concepts fit both the common
law's strong prima facie case and the German law's use of prima facie
proof (Anscheinsbeweis) and presumption. Article 3.8 provides that if the
claimant shows Fact A (e.g., that the respondent has violated a covered
agreement), then this constitutes prima facie proof of the existence of Fact
B (nullification or impairment of a benefit). Put another way, showing Fact
A gives rise to a presumption that Fact B exists. The presumption's effect
puts the burden on the respondent to rebut the existence of Fact B (nullifi-
cation or impairment of a benefit).
Article 3.8 does not exactly clarify what the rebuttal requirement
entails. Does the rebuttal requirement shift only the production burden or
also the burden of persuasion (the full burden of proof)? Because the con-
cept of a production burden in a WTO proceeding is relatively meaning-
less, as will be explained below, we can assume that Article 3.8 intends to
shift to the respondent the full burden of proof on nullification or impair-
ment of a benefit. 104
The well-known Superfund case1 0 5 illustrates why subsequent deci-
103. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
art. 3.8, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226
(1994) [hereinafter DSU].
104. See infra notes 106-112 and accompanying text.
105. Report of the Panel, United States- Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Sub-
stances, L/6175 (une 17, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136 (1987) [hereinafter
Superfund].
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sions have not clarified this issue. This pre-WTO case arose under Article
XXIII of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade1 0 6 (GATT) and
involved an admitted violation by the United States of Article III's national
treatment obligation concerning internal taxes. 10 7 The United States taxed
imported oil more (but only slightly more) than domestic oil.108 Because
the Superfund case defined the "benefit" in the phrase "nullification or
impairment of a benefit" as the right under Article III to an equal "competi-
tive relationship" between imported and domestic goods (instead of altered
trade flows), the violation of Article III was the same as denial of an equal
competitive relationship. 10 9 Thus, the presumption of a "nullification or
impairment of a benefit" became by definition an irrebutable presump-
tion.110 Furthermore, because the denied "benefit" in most GATT and
WTO disputes is the benefit of having an equal "competitive relation-
ship,"11 1 a violation of a covered agreement automatically becomes a "nul-
lification and impairment of a benefit." 112 Rebuttal is impossible, and
thus one never learns whether the prima facie and presumption concepts
in DSU Article 3.8 shift the full burden of proof.
It could well be that in US- Shirts and Blouses' 13 the AB borrowed the
prima facie and presumption concepts (and their shifting of a rebuttal bur-
den to the respondent) from Article 3.8. The opinion makes clear, how-
ever, that the AB understood that the issue in US-Shirts and Blouses was
not the same as the issue addressed in Article 3.8.114 In Article 3.8, the
issue is whether a violation of a covered agreement produces a "nullifica-
tion or impairment" of a benefit; whereas, in US- Shirts and Blouses, the
issue was whether a violation of a covered agreement existed in the first
place. 1 15 Nevertheless, the AB may well have borrowed the concepts and
applied them in a context where they do not fit. Under Article 3.8, prima
facie and presumption concepts make sense. They apply where the claim-
ant establishes Fact A (a WTO violation) so that Fact B (nullification or
impairment) is presumed to exist unless the respondent can establish non-
B. In US- Shirts and Blouses, the first step-the existence of Fact A-is the
only issue. US-Shirts and Blouses does not fit the binary fact pattern for
which a presumption is appropriate-showing A raises a presumption of B.
Applying prima facie and presumption concepts when only Fact A is in
dispute, and has not been previously established, leads to confusion.
106. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
107. See Superfund, supra note 105, 9 3.1.1.
108. Id. 3.1.2.
109. See id. 9 5.1.9.
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See US-Shirts and Blouses, supra note 4, at 13.
114. See id. at 13-14.
115. See id.
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C. A Generous Interpretation
On reflection, it seems unlikely that the AB intends anything radical in
its burden of proof formulations in US- Shirts and Blouses, EC- Hormones,
and other decisions. Overall, its decisions have been cautious and text-
bound-a tendency that is fully understandable for a young adjudicatory
body that has exceptional responsibility for adjudicating intergovernmen-
tal disputes over sometimes very politically charged regulatory policies. To
make sense of the AB's burden of proof terminology, it helps to have in
mind the uniqueness of the WTO panel procedure. What follows is a brief
synopsis of that procedure.
1. Multiple Hearings and the Simultaneous Submission of Evidence
First, WTO panels operate under strict time constraints imposed by
the DSU. 116 In this system, after the initial pleading stage, both sides gen-
erally submit evidence and arguments simultaneously-usually in written
form-and not in ordered sequence as in common law (where claimant
submits first, then respondent). 117 The claimant must initiate the proceed-
ing with a formal statement of claim, which is usually accompanied by
written supporting evidence in the form of appendices attached to the
claim."i 8 The respondent has two to three weeks to file a response, which
is also accompanied by written evidence contained in appendices. 1 19
Thus, at the pleading stage, both sides will have already submitted evi-
dence. After the pleading stage, both sides usually submit further evidence
and arguments simultaneously (in contrast to the common law's ordered
sequence). 1 20
The panel procedure does not contain anything like the common law's
formal motion practice to test the sufficiency of the claimant's evidence at
any point in the procedure. After the pleading stage, it is understood that
the claimant may submit additional written evidence in response to the
respondent's evidence, assertions, and arguments and to questions from
the panel. 12 1 At the first hearing, both sides comment on and contest the
other side's presentations and arguments, and the panel poses questions to
each side. 12 2 Afterwards, the two sides will simultaneously present further
supporting documentation and legal argument responding to the panel's
questions and to the assertions each side has made about the other side's
case. 12 3 After a second hearing, the panel may or may not request or per-
mit further written submissions. 124
116. See DSU arts. 3.12, 12.8.
117. See id. art. 12.6, app. 3, paras. 4, 7.
118. See id. art. 12.6, app. 3.
119. See id. art. 12.6, app. 3, para. 12.
120. See id. art. 12.6. See generally id. app. 3.
121. See id. app. 3, para. 7.
122. See id. app. 3, para. 5.
123. See id. app. 3, paras. 7, 8.
124. See id. app. 3, paras. 8, 12 (discussing proposed timetable for panel work, noting
that the calendar "may be changed in the light of unforeseen developments," and
allowing for additional meetings with the parties).
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The panel will then render its decision, initially in a draft preliminary
ruling and, after receiving the parties' comments, in a final ruling. 125 At no
point in this procedure will a panel issue a specific ruling on the narrow
question of whether the claimant (or respondent) has met its production
burden. 12 6 Instead, the panel in its deliberations decides which party
prevails on which issues-presumably taking into account which side bears
the burden of persuasion on each issue.
2. Only Burden of Persuasion Matters and It Does Not Shift
With this procedural background in mind, a generous reading of the
AB's burden of proof formulations might be articulated in the following
way. In saying that the claimant has the burden of presenting a prima facie
case that raises a presumption of its correctness, the AB is only trying to
capture the claimant's basic responsibility to present a reasonably plausible
case-the common law's weak prima facie case. In a time-constrained pro-
cess in which evidence is not presented in an ordered sequence, but rather
simultaneously, at consecutive points in the process, and in response to
questions from the panel and presentations from the other side, there is no
point at which a panel is asked to decide formally whether the claimant
has met its burden of production. Instead, the overriding issue is the bur-
den of persuasion, which at the panel's deliberation stage effectively
absorbs any concept of a production burden. If after the parties have
presented all their evidence and arguments the panel .is- unpersuaded or in
equipoise, the party with the persuasion burden loses.
What then, one might ask, of the AB's burden-shifting terminology in
US- Shirts and Blouses and EC- Hormones? In some AB formulations, one
gets the impression that the persuasion burden, itself, shifts to the respon-
dent, but this interpretation would seem to be a misunderstanding of the
AB's intent. Nothing in its reasoning or analysis would justify such a shift.
Instead, what the AB appears to mean is that a loose kind of production
burden, which is never formally tested, shifts. It is probably a misnomer
even to speak of it as a burden.
Thus, for the AB to state that a claimant must make out a prima facie
case that raises a presumption in its favor could simply be an imprecise way
of saying that the claimant must introduce enough evidence and argument
to raise a presumption of correctness in the colloquial sense-a reasonable
person could agree with the claimant, though such a person would not be
forced to do so. Furthermore, to say that the burden would then shift to
the respondent to rebut the claimant's case could just be an imprecise way
of saying that a respondent has a good faith obligation to come forward
with countering evidence throughout the proceeding, and if the respondent
125. See generally id. app. 3, para. 12 (describing the working procedures of the panel
in a timetable format).
126. See generally id. app. 3.
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does very little in this regard it will probably lose as a practical matter. 127
Admittedly, a number of panel and AB decisions use language that is
difficult to square with this suggested generous interpretation of US- Shirts
and Blouses. 128 In fact in EC-Hormones, after first equating a prima facie
case with the claimant's initial burden as described in US-Shirts and
Blouses, the AB goes on to say the following: "It is also well to remember
that a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective refutation
by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour
of the complaining party presenting the prima facie case."' 29 It seems
impossible to square this language-if taken at face value-with the sug-
gested generous interpretation above. In EC- Hormones, a prima facie case
seems to be a decisive case, one that is overwhelming and that will yield a
claimant victory as a matter of law unless "effectively refuted."' 30 Surely,
however, a claimant is not required in every case to present overwhelming
proof instead of merely a plausible case as part of its initial production
burden. So what then does prima facie case mean in the prior formula-
tion? If the AB uses it to mean a case that invokes a legal presumption (prov-
ing Fact A causes Fact B to be taken as presumptively established), then
what exactly is the required proxy proof (what is Fact A)? Moreover, why
does the presumption device operate in every WTO proceeding, not just in
special cases where social policy reasons call for it? Finally, what burden,
exactly, is shifted?
These questions are not so pressing, however, if the difficult language
in EC- Hormones is not taken simply at face value. In a later case,
Canada-Aircraft,'3 1 the AB employed precisely the same language, but
then offered further explanation that casts that language in a very different
light. In Canada- Aircraft, the panel asked Canada to provide certain infor-
mation on the financing of an aircraft transaction, but Canada refused on
the ground that the complainant, Brazil, had not made out a prima facie
case.132 Bearing that context in mind, the AB repeated the ambiguous lan-
guage from EC- Hormones and added further discussion:
A prima facie case, it is well to remember, is a case which, in the absence of
effective refutation by the defending party (that is, in the present appeal, the
Member requested to provide the information), requires a panel, as a matter
of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party presenting the prima facie
case. There is... nothing in either the DSU or the SCM Agreement to sup-
port Canada's assumption [that it need not provide the requested informa-
tion if Brazil has not first made out a prima facie case]. To the contrary, a
panel is vested with ample and extensive discretionary authority to deter-
127. Both Taniguchi and Unterhalter appear to favor this colloquial understanding of
the AB's burden-shifting language. See Taniguchi, supra note 1, at 566-67, 571;
Unterhalter, supra note 1, at 551.
128. See, e.g., EC-Hormones, supra note 6, 11 103-104.
129. Id. 9 104 (citing US-Shirts and Blouses, supra note 4, at 14, as support for the
quoted text) (emphasis added).
130. See id.
131. See Appellate Body Report, Canada- Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Air-
craft, ' 192, WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Canada-Aircraft].
132. Id. 78-83.
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mine when it needs information to resolve a dispute and what information it
needs. A panel may need such information before or after a complaining...
Member has established its complaint . . . on a prima facie basis. A panel
may, in fact, need the information sought in order to evaluate evidence
already before it in the course of determining whether the claiming ... Mem-
ber ... has established a prima facie case .... 133
From this discussion, it seems that the AB is using prima facie case to
mean simply a plausible case for the complainant. The claimant must
make out that plausible case. The AB has ruled that a panel should not use
its independent fact-finding power to make out a prima facie case for the
claimant.134 But the Canada- Aircraft discussion demonstrates that the AB
expects both sides to submit evidence and information for the panel's eval-
uation and that the panel may need information from both sides to decide
whether the claimant has a plausible case-or better put, whether it has a
winning case in the end. These submissions of evidence and argument
occur at consecutive points in the process and even simultaneously from
both sides. So the AB's reference to a burden shifting to the respondent
seems best understood as a way of saying that if the claimant makes out a
plausible case, the respondent will lose (or will probably lose) unless it
rebuts that case. It is only at the panel's final ruling that we learn whether
the claimant's case, in light of any rebuttal evidence from the respondent,
was nevertheless convincing enough to win. Given that the panel never
performs a separate test to determine whether the claimant has met the
production burden, the production burden is effectively merged into the
persuasion burden, and it is the latter concept that dominates the panel's
decision-making process.
3. The Lingering Risks of Ambiguity
a. Excessive Burden on the Complaining Member
Of course, the availability of a generous interpretation that can make
sense of the AB's burden of proof terminology does not cure the problem.
The risk that a future panel will not settle upon such an interpretation and
instead will take the AB's burden of proof language at face value remains.
Two different and opposite errors would then be imaginable. A future
panel might employ the AB's burden of proof language to impose an exces-
sive burden of proof on the complaining member. This excessive burden
could result were the panel to require a claimant to make such a strong case
that the claimant simply must win if the respondent does not rebut. Com-
mon law would describe such a case as an overwhelming case. It is pre-
133. Id. ' 192.
134. See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, VI
129-130, WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999). A related point is that a complainant may
not simply place a complicated piece of the respondent's legislation before the panel and
expect the panel to analyze for itself what part of that legislation is relevant to the claim-
ant's argument. See Appellate Body Report, United States- Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 140, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005).
The claimant must spell this out, or otherwise it has not met its burden of proof. See id.
cl 140-141.
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cisely this kind of case that shifts the burden of production in common
law.135 Thus, a panel might understand a prima facie case as requiring a
strong-overwhelmingly strong-case, and without such an overwhelming
case, the panel might simply decide for the respondent.
What should a panel do instead? Assuming that preponderance of the
evidence is the applicable standard of proof, a panel should consider the
evidence from both sides, decide whether it is more probable than not that
the historical facts are as the claimant alleges, and-once having deter-
mined the historical facts-decide whether the necessary legal conclusion
(a mixed question of law and fact) follows. If the panel is in equipoise and
cannot make up its mind, then the claimant loses.
In trying to apply a concept of a prima facie case that raises a pre-
sumption in favor of the claimant and shifts a rebuttal burden to the
respondent, a panel might look for evidence favoring the claimant that is so
strong that no reasonable person could fail to find for the claimant. How-
ever, that would require too much from the claimant. Still, some of the AB
decisions are open to this kind of misreading.
b. Excessive Burden on the Responding Member
Conversely, the AB's terminology could mislead a future panel into
requiring too much from a respondent. If a future panel reads prima facie,
as the term implies, as requiring that a claimant's case meet a minimum
threshold of plausibility that would justify (but not require) a decision in
the claimant's favor, such a weak prima facie case should not shift the bur-
den of proof to the respondent. In such a situation, a respondent who fails
to present rebuttal evidence (and merely argues against drawing the infer-
ences the claimant urges) should not automatically lose. The test for
whether the claimant wins should be whether, after evaluating the claim-
ant's evidence (and any rebuttal evidence the respondent presents) and
drawing what inferences the panel considers appropriate, the panel con-
cludes that it is more probable than not that the claimant has established
its alleged historical facts and mixed law/fact legal conclusions. If the
panel is in equipoise, the claimant, who bears the burden of persuasion,
loses. In the face of the AB's ambiguous language, however, a future panel
could decide that once the claimant makes out a weak prima facie case, the
full burden of proof shifts to the respondent. This interpretation would
unfairly burden the respondent.
Conclusion
To summarize, one can read the AB decisions on burden of proof-
albeit by employing a considerable amount of interpretive generosity-as
saying that the burden of persuasion, which is the key concept, rests on the
claimant as to the claimant's basic claim of a WTO violation and does not
135. See CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 12, at 1310 ("Sometimes the plaintiffs evidence
may be overwhelming, so that the judge will hold that no reasonable juror could fail to
find A.").
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shift during the course of the proceeding. But such a reading is not self-
evident. Without more clarity, the current ambiguity that attends the AB's
burden of proof formulations can lead to serious misunderstandings and
errors, especially at the panel level. Those errors might disadvantage either
side in a litigated dispute. A panel might understand the concept of prima
facie case to require a much too overwhelming level of proof from the
claimant because, after all, such a case seems to have serious consequences
for what is required of the respondent in rebuttal. Conversely, a different
panel might allow a rather weak claimant's case to meet the prima facie
requirement and then effectively reason that the full burden of proof is
shifted to the respondent. These effects might even occur inside the panel's
conference room without being expressed in the panel's published decision
or otherwise coming to light.
The upshot then is that the AB should clarify the ambiguity that the
US-Shirts and Blouses and EC- Hormones formulations created. It should
clarify what exactly it means by burden of proof, prima facie case, and
presumption. If the generous interpretation offered earlier is correct, then
the AB's future decisions could articulate that more clearly, clarifying the
confusing discussion of a presumption that shifts an "onus" to the respon-
dent. The AB could abandon altogether the concepts of prima facie and
presumption-which seems to be the preferable choice-or the AB could
interpret these concepts in the "generous" way suggested here so as to
render them essentially inoperative. Alternatively, if the generous interpre-
tation suggested here is not correct, then one would hope that the AB
would not wait long before explaining more clearly its understanding of the
concept of burden of proof in the WTO system and the reasoning that sup-
ports that understanding.

